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THE FAILURE OF THE VIRGINIA EXEMPTION PLAN
Even though a creditor successfully reduces his claim to judg-
ment, he nonetheless faces certain restrictions on the property of
the debtor that he may appropriate to satisfy his judgment. In Vir-
ginia, these restrictions take the form of exemption laws reflecting
the legislature's determination that, as a matter of public policy,
the debtor may designate certain property to be exempt from the
creditor's process. Although rarely articulated, the primary pur-
pose of the exemption scheme is to strike a balance between com-
peting public interests of protecting the debtor and his family
against their own fiscal improvidence and at the same time, ensur-
ing the judgment creditor that assets other than those essential for
the debtor's maintenance and care will be available to satisfy the
amount due.1
In carrying out the intent of the legislature, the courts of Vir-
ginia have stated that the exemption statutes are not to be strictly
construed but rather interpreted liberally in favor of the debtor.2
Accordingly, the judgment creditor must be fully informed about
the various exemptions available to the debtor not only to ascer-
tain whether his judgment is collectible, but also to avoid the ex-
pense of attempting to enforce his judgment against property that
the debtor is entitled to exempt. Likewise, the debtor must be
aware of his exemption rights lest he lose them unwittingly.
This Note will detail the exemptions available to a debtor in Vir-
ginia and explain why the current scheme of exemptions no longer
is viable. The exemptions that Congress has made available to a
debtor under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 also will be con-
1. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virgmia has declared that the object of the
exemption statutes is to provide the debtor and his family with "the bread of life and a
pillow whereon to lay the head, to save them from destruction and absolute want." State ex
rel. Burt v. Allen, 48 W Va. 154, 162-63, 35 S.E. 990, 993 (1900).
Other purposes of exemption statutes are to preserve the family unit, to effect the rehabil-
itation of the debtor and thereby to help him manage his debts, and to minimize judgment
debtor's losses through forced execution sales. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights,
62 GEo. L.J. 779, 785-88 (1974).
2. See, e.g., S. Hill Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hudson, 174 Va. 284, 287, 6 S.E.2d 668, 669
(1940); Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Ring, 167 Va. 121, 126, 187 S.E. 449, 451 (1936).
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sidered to demonstrate how the federal exemptions affect Vir-
ginia's statutory scheme. Finally, some suggestions will be made as
to how Virginia might proceed to establish a more realistic exemp-
tion plan.
Although the primary purpose of this Symposium is to focus on
Virginia's postjudgment collection procedure, the Virginia exemp-
tion plan cannot be evaluated apart from its effect in a bankruptcy
context. Many of the exemptions available to a debtor in Virginia
have been written and revised with an awareness of their effects in
bankruptcy A recent legislative enactment makes the state exemp-
tion scheme an integral part of the exemptions available to the
bankrupt.'
To label Virginia's statutory exemptions a "scheme" or a "plan"
is somewhat misleading because an investigation of the exemption
statutes reveals that, although the great bulk of the available ex-
emptions constitute one section of the Code of Virginia,4 many
other exemptions are scattered throughtout the Code.5 Addition-
ally, the legislature has enacted many of the individual exemption
statutes without considering other exemptions or attempting to
maintain the necessary balance between competing debtor and
3. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 34-17 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The Code provides the following:
The real or personal estate which a householder, his surviving spouse or minor
children are entitled to hold as exempt may be set apart at any time before it
is subjected by sale or otherwise ., provided that (1) any person who files a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy may set it apart before or on the same day
that he files his petition but not thereafter, or (2) any person against whom an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy is filed may set it apart at any time before
the expiration of the period after its adjudication within which he is required
to file his schedules.
Id. See also Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459,
1463 n.33 (1959).
4. Title 34 of the Virginia Code, entitled "Homestead and Other Exemptions," contains
the majority of the state's exemptions.
5. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-489 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (exemption of unsevered crops); § 19.2-
368.12 (Supp. 1979) (exemption of award of compensation to victim of a crime); §§ 38.1-448,
-449 (Repl. Vol. 1976) (exemption of proceeds of life insurance policies); § 38.1-482 (Repl.
Vol. 1976) (exemption of group life insurance policies and the proceeds thereof); § 55-165
(Repl. Vol. 1974) (exemption of the debtor's income when he has effected a valid assignment
for the benefit of creditors); § 60.1-125 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (exemption for unemployment
compensation); § 64.1-126 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (exemption of the victuals intended for the con-
sumption of the debtor's family at his death); § 65.1-82 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (exemption for
workmen's compensation benefits).
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creditor interests. If these statutes represent a "plan," it is neither
a consolidated nor a coherent one.
THE VIRGINIA EXEMPTIONS
The Homestead
Central to the Virginia exemption scheme, and probably the
debtor's most valuable right, is the so-called "homestead." Origi-
nally intended to protect the family6 and to maintain the home,7
the homestead exemption was available only to those who had a
legal or moral duty to support others.8 Recent amendments, how-
ever, have extended the exemption to any person, married or un-
married, who maintains a separate residence or living quarters, re-
gardless of whether others live with hun.9
The Virginia statute explicitly states that the debtor may claim
the homestead exemption out of real or personal property, or
both.1" Occasionally revised, the present statute permits the debtor
to select homestead property up to a maximum value of $5,000.11
6. Hatorff v. Wellford, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 356, 361 (1876).
7. Murphy v. City of Richmond, 111 Va. 459, 465, 69 S.E. 442, 444 (1910).
8. See VA. CODE § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 1976) (amended 1978 and 1979).
9. Id. § 34-1 (Supp. 1979) (as amended 1978 and 1979). Before 1978, the statute defined a
"householder," the one entitled to claim the homestead exemption, as "one who occupies
such a relationship towards persons living with him as to entitle them to a legal or moral
right to look to him for support and who, in turn, has the duty of supporting such persons."
Id. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 1976). In 1978, the legislature, evidently to expand the reach of the
exemption, added the following sentence: "The word 'householder' shall also include any
person who maintains a separate residence of his own whether or not others are living with
him." Act of March 25, 1978, c. 253, 1978 Va. Acts 398 (emphasis supplied). And in 1979,
apparently to clarify the import of the 1978 amendment and also to simplify the definition,
the General Assembly of Virginia repealed all existing language and amended the relevant
portion of the statute to read, "The word 'householder' as used in this title shall include any
person, married or unmarried, who maintains a separate residence or living quarters,
whether or not others are living with him." VA. CODE § 34-1 (Supp. 1979).
10. Id. § 34-4.
11. Id. § 34-4 (Supp. 1979). In 1975 the legislature increased the homestead exemption
amount from $2,000 to $3,500. Act of March 20, 1975, c. 466, 1975 Va. Acts 800. The exemp-
tion was increased in 1977 to $5,000. Act of March 29, 1977, c. 496, 1977 Va. Acts 738. The
frequent increases reflect the legislature's concern that the exemption is not keeping pace
with inflation. Despite these attempts, the debtor continually loses the true value of the
exemption in a period of sustained inflation.
Section 34-4.1 of the Virginia Code states that resident veterans having a "service con-
nected disability" of 40% or more are entitled to claim as exempt an additional $2,000
worth of real or personal property. VA. CODE § 34-4.1 (Supp. 1979).
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Presumably, the legislative intent in expanding the exemption be-
yond real property is to treat as equally as possible all debtors,
whether homeowners or renters; if the exemption had been limited
to real property, homeowners would be favored even though a sub-
stantial portion of the population does not own homes. 12 By al-
lowing the debtor to select personal property the renter can ex-
empt enough money to continue his rental payments for some time
into the future. Nonetheless, the statute does not obligate the
debtor to select any particular property; the property selected need
bear no relationship to the preservation of the debtor's home. He is
free to exempt his savings account, automobile, television, boat, or
all of these provided the aggregate value does not exceed $5,000.13
Procedural Requirements
Despite the central importance of the homestead exemption,
there are a number of obstacles the debtor must overcome before
he may validly claim it. The statute specifies that the debtor must
"select" the property to be exempted.14 The Virginia Supreme
Court has interpreted this provision to mean that the privilege is
personal to the debtor; if he fails to act, no one else may claim the
exemption on his behalf.15 More important, however, is the re-
12. The most recent figures show that slightly over 35% of the occupied units in this
country are occupied by renters whereas the remainder are owner occupied. U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, series P-20, C3.186
No. 340: Household and Family Characteristics (March 1978) (published in July, 1979).
13. This is clearly the effect of the language found in § 34-4 of the Code, the homestead
provision. Section 34-13, however, apparently enacted to complement § 34-4 and to empha-
size that the debtor may claim any amount of the homestead in personal property, actually
conflicts with the language of § 34-4. As currently written, § 34-13 limits the amount of the
personal estate to $3,500, despite the $5,000 limitation found in § 34-4. The only logical
explanation for this discrepancy is legislative oversight; apparently, the legislature neglected
to update the monetary amount in this section m 1977 when it did so in all other pertinent
sections. In years past, §§ 34-4 and 34-13 have referred to the same monetary ceiling.
Of course, another, more strained interpretation is possible, namely, that the legislature
deliberately is limiting the homestead in personal property to $3,500. This is unlikely be-
cause, in addition to contradicting § 34-4, it clearly would be inconsistent with the policy of
treating homeowners and renters alike. In any event, the section duplicates § 34-4 and
therefore is unnecessary; rather than being revised, it should be repealed. See, e.g., VA. CODE
§ 34-4 (Supp. 1979) and VA. CODE § 34-13 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
14. Id. § 34-4 (Supp. 1979).
15. See Linkenhoker's Heirs v. Detrick, 81 Va. 44, 56-57 (1885). In the event of the death
of the debtor, others may be entitled to claim the homestead exemption. See note 34 infra
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quirement that the debtor must declare the homestead strictly in
compliance with the statutorily prescribed procedure. If the home-
stead is claimed in real property, the debtor must claim the ex-
emption in writing and have the writing recorded in the county
where the real estate is located.16 If the homestead is claimed in
personal property, the property must be clearly identified in a
writing signed by the debtor and recorded in the county where the
debtor resides. 17 Until the debtor complies with the requirement of
recordation, he is not entitled to the exemption."' Also, the debtor
must attach to the recorded instrument a "cash valuation" of the
property exempted in order for his creditors to determine whether
the claimed value fairly represents the true value of the property 18
Another less formidable obstacle to the debor is the time limita-
tion for recording the exemption. The relevant statute specifies
that the property which the debtor is entitled to hold as exempt
may be set apart "at any time before it is subjected by sale or oth-
erwise under judgment, decree, order, execution, or other legal pro-
cess -20 In keeping with the general policy of construing ex-
emption statutes liberally in favor of the debtor, particularly the
homestead,2 ' the Virginia Supreme Court has recently held that so
long as the court has not decreed a sale of the property or ordered
a garnishee to pay money to the judgment creditor, the debtor may
file a homestead deed. 22
& accompanying text.
16. VA. CODE § 34-6 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
17. Id. § 34-14.
18. In re Robmette, 34 F Supp. 518, 521 (W.D. Va. 1932).
19. In re Waltrip, 260 F Supp. 448, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1966). See also In re Wilson, 108 F
197, 198 (W.D. Va. 1901). The courts have offered no guidance regarding how the debtor
should arrive at a just "cash valuation."
20. VA. CODE § 34-17 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
21. See Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Reese, 170 Va. 275, 279, 196 S.E. 625, 626 (1938).
22. Wilson v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 214 Va. 14, 15, 196 S.E.2d 920, 921 (1973) (per curiam).
In Wilson, the bank obtained a judgment on April 22, 1971, against Mrs. Wilson. When she
received life insurance proceeds in January 1972, the bank caused garnishment summonses
to be served on other banks as garnishees. Mrs. Wilson recorded her homestead deed on
April 10, 1972. The court held that the filing was timely and that she could claim the benefit
of the exemption. Section 34-17 specifies certain filing requirements applicable when the
debtor is claiming the exemption in a bankruptcy proceeding. See note 3 supra.
1980] 855
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:851
Claims Enforceable Against the Homestead
Another concern of the debtor is the Virginia statute that pro-
vides that certain debts exist against which the homestead exemp-
tion may not be asserted.23 In other words, creditors whose judg-
ments are based upon these specified kinds of debts can enforce
their claims against the debtor's property despite the homestead.
Paramount among these are claims based on debts that aided the
debtor in acqmring the property 24 For example, if the debtor owns
a house valued at $50,000 and encumbered by a $45,000 deed of
trust which secures a debt that allowed the debtor to purchase the
house, a third party creditor may make no claim against the prop-
erty because the debtor is permitted to claim the full $5,000 "eq-
uity" in the house and the deed of trust beneficiary is entitled to
claim the remaining $45,000. If, however, the debtor's "equity" in
his home exceeds the $5,000 maximum, then the third party credi-
23. VA. CODE § 34-5 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The statute reads as follows:
Such exemption shall not extend to any execution order or other process issued
on any demand m the following cases:
(1) For the purchase price of such property or any part thereof. If the
property purchased and not paid for be exchanged for or converted into other
property by the debtor, such last named property shall not be exempted from
the payment of such unpaid purchase money under the provisions of the pre-
ceding section (§ 34-4).
(2) For services rendered by a laboring person or mechanic.
(3) For liabilities incurred by any public officer or officer of a court, or any
fiduciary, or any attorney at law for money collected.
(4) For a lawful claim for any taxes, levies or assessments.
(5) For rent.
(6) For the legal or taxable fees of any public officer or officer of a court.
(7) Such exemption shall not be claimed or held in a shifting stock of mer-
chandise or in any property.
24. Other examples include claims made by a mechanic or "laboring person" which is
defined to include any householder who receives wages for his services. Id. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol.
1976). This broad definition effectively establishes a significant exception to the homestead
exemption because many persons, claiming to be included within the definition, may be able
to defeat the debtor's claim to the homestead exemption.
Other claims assertable against the homestead include claims of an attorney for money
collected; claims for rent; any lawful claim for taxes, levies, or assessment; claims for the
fees of any public officer or an officer of a court; and any claim based upon a "shifting
stock" of merchandise when the conveyance by the debtor is subsequently set aside because
of fraud or lack of consideration. Id. § 34-5. "Shifting stock" is property assigned for the
benefit of creditors or following an adjudication of voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy. Id.
§ 34-5(7).
VIRGINIA EXEMPTION PLAN
tor is entitled to have the property sold in order to satisfy his
claim.25 The proceeds of the sale first go to the deed of trust bene-
ficiary, because his claim is one of the exceptions to the home-
stead,26 and therefore superior, to the debtor to the extent of
$5,000; the excess is paid to the judgment creditor.27 Any surplus
remaining after the judgment creditor has been paid will be re-
turned to the debtor.
The debtor may claim his homestead exemption only once.2s
When the house or other property previously claimed as the home-
stead, is sold, however, the debtor may retain his homestead ex-
emption.2 He does this by applying the proceeds of the sale of the
exempt property to the purchase of new property; in effect, the
debtor's exemption "carries over." To ensure that the exemption
does "carry over," the debtor must comply with the recordation
requirements for declaration of the homestead in the new property
and specify in the writing that the new property was partially or
wholly acquired with exempt proceeds.3 0 Failure to comply with
this procedure results in the loss of the exemption.
Other Provisions Relating to the Homestead
Several other aspects of the Virginia homestead provision de-
serve mention. Homestead rights survive the death of the home-
steader.3 1 When the homesteader dies the surviving spouse and mi-
nor children may claim the benefit of the exemption not only as to
the debts of the deceased but also as to their own debts.3 2 The
surviving spouse may claim this benefit until remarriage.33 If the
homesteader dies before having selected a homestead, then the
surviving spouse or minor children are entitled to claim the
exemption.34
25. Id. § 34-19 (Supp. 1979).
26. Id. § 34-5(1) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
27. Id. § 34-19 (Supp. 1979).
28. Id. § 34-21 (Supp. 1979).
29. Id. §§ 34-7, 34-9, 34-20 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
30. Id. § 34-20; see notes 16-17, 19 supra & accompanying text.
31. Id. §§ 34-10, 34-15 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
32. Id.
33. Id. The minor children, if any, may claim the benefit of the exemption until they
marry or reach the age of 18. Id.
34. Id. §§ 34-11, 34-15. If the surviving spouse claims and receives either dower or
1980]
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One important aspect of the exemption scheme is that if at the
time the debtor declares his homestead the value of the property is
within the statutory ceiling of $5,000, then any subsequent in-
crease in value of the homestead is also exempt.3 5 Additionally, any
rents and profits derived from the homestead property may be
held exempt to the same extent as the homestead itself.36 Thus, if
a judgment creditor cannot enforce his judgment against certain
property because the debtor has properly selected it as his home-
stead, the creditor likewise will be unable to reach rents and profits
derived from the property
Waiver of Homestead
The Code of Virginia expressly provides that the debtor may
waive his homestead exemption. The Virginia Supreme Court has
upheld the waiver noting that the right to waive the homestead
exemption is as much a part of the statutory provisions as the
right to claim the exemption.3 8 The United States District Court
curtesy, then the spouse may not claim any homestead in real property and the value of the
dower or curtesy must be deducted from the amount of the exemption in personal property
otherwise assertable. Id. §§ 34-12, 34-15.
35. Id. § 34-18 (Supp. 1979). The statute provides the following:
The rents and profits of the property set apart as the homestead shall be ex-
empt in the same manner as the corpus of the homestead and if the whole real
and personal estate set apart be not of greater value than five thousand dollars
at the time it is so set apart the exemption thereof shall not be affected by any
increase in its value afterwards, unless such increase consists of permanent im-
provements placed upon real estate set apart by means derived from some
source other than the homestead.
Id.
Although this statute has yet to be interpreted by the courts, the language suggests that
the property designated as the homestead cannot exceed a total value of $5,000 if the debtor
intends to claim the benefit of a subsequent increase in value of the property. In other
words, if the exemption applies to less than the property's total value the exemption always
will be limited to $5,000. This discourages the debtor from declaring his house to be his
homestead exemption when the value of "whole real and personal estate" exceeds $5,000.
The use of the term "estate" instead of "property," however, suggests that the $5,000 limit
applies not to value of the property but rather the debtor's interest in the property. Argua-
bly, this would allow the debtor to claim an increase in his exemption value in proportion to
the increase in the value of the entire property.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 34-22. Note, however, that this statute is partially overruled by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. See notes 147-48 infra & accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Reese, 170 Va. 275, 279, 196 S.E. 625, 626
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for the Eastern District of Virginia recently rejected the argument
that the statutory right of homestead waiver is either unconstitu-
tional as a matter of state law or void as contrary to public pol-
icy 31 Nonetheless, the waiver must be clear and unequivocal; it
may not arise from mere implication.40 The waiver must be m writ-
ing, either in the instrument under which the debtor is liable or in
a writing affixed thereto; the writing must state that the debtor
waives the homestead exemption that he otherwise would be enti-
tled to claim.41
Procedurally, if the judgment creditor has a valid waiver, the
creditor may enforce his claim against the property of the debtor.42
If, however, his claim is unsecured, the creditor first must exhaust
all other assets of the debtor before proceeding against the
homestead.43
Poor Debtor's Exemption
Virginia, in a statute commonly referred to as the Poor Debtor's
Exemption, allows a resident debtor to exempt over seventy spe-
cific items of personalty, any or all of which may be claimed.44
(1938) ("The right to claim, or to waive, the homestead exemption is a purely personal right.
It is a mere personal privilege extended in the benignity of the law to the debtor, which he
may waive or claim at his election.") (citation omitted).
39. Barbarossa v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 438 F Supp. 840, 841-42 (E.D. Va. 1977).
40. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Reese, 170 Va. 275, 279, 196 S.E. 625, 626 (1938). In
Reese, the Home Owners' Loan Corp. made a loan to Mr. and Mrs. Porter. The loan was
evidenced by a negotiable promissory note and secured by a deed of trust on certain realty.
Both the note and the deed of trust waived the benefit of the homestead exemption. Subse-
quently, the Porters conveyed the property to Reese, who expressly assumed payment of the
indebtedness secured by the deed of trust. No mention was made of any waiver of home-
stead in the transaction with Reese. When Reese later defaulted on the loan, the property
was foreclosed on, leaving a deficiency of $1,500. Home Owners' attempted to sue Reese but
he contended that he had not waived the benefit of the homestead exemption. The Virginia
Supreme Court held that the exemption waiver was not binding on Reese. Stated the court,
"The assumption clause contains no declaration of the waiver of the homestead There
is no such declaration of Reese by writing, upon any instrument for the payment of money,
or in any writing annexed thereto." Id. at 279, 196 S.E. at 626.
41. VA. CODE § 34-22 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The debtor, however, may waive only his home-
stead exemption, not any other exemptions. Id.
42. Other property of the debtor may be exempt. See id. §§ 34-26, 34-27 (Supp. 1979), 34-
29 (Repl. Vol. 1976). See also note 5 supra.
43. VA. CODE § 34-23 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
44. Id. § 34-26 (Supp. 1979). The Code provides as follows:
In addition to the estate, not exceeding in value five thousand dollars, which
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Farmers are allowed to exempt additional items.45 If applicable,
every householder residing in this State shall be entitled to hold exempt, as
provided in chapter 2 (§ 34-4 et. seq.) of this title, he shall also be entitled to
hold exempt from levy or distress the following articles or so much or so many
thereof as he may have, to be selected by him or his agents:
(1) The family Bible.
(la) Wedding and engagement rings.
(2) Family pictures, schoolbooks and library for the use of the family.
(3) A lot in a burial ground.
(4) All necessary wearing apparel of the debtor and his family, all beds,
bedsteads and bedding necessary for the use of such family, two dressers or
two dressing tables, wardrobes, chifforobes or chests of drawers or a dresser
and a dressing table; carpets, rugs, linoleum or other floor covering; and all
stoves and appendages put up and kept for the use of the family not exceeding
three.
(5) All cats, dogs, birds, squirrels, rabbits and other pets not kept or raised
for sale; one cow and her calf until one year old, one horse, six chairs, six
plates, one table, twelve knives, twelve forks, two dozen spoons, twelve dishes,
or if the family consists of more than twelve, then a plate, knife, fork and two
spoons, and a dish for each member thereof; two basins, one pot, one oven, six
pieces of wooden or earthenware; one dining room table, one buffet, china
press, one icebox, freezer or refrigerator of any construction, one washing ma-
chine, one clothes dryer not to exceed on hundred fifty dollars in value, one
loom and its appurtenances, one kitchen safe or one kitchen cabinet or press,
one spinning wheel, one pair of cards, one axe and provisions other than those
hereinafter set out of the value of fifty dollars; two hoes; fifty bushels of shelled
corn, or, in lieu thereof, twenty-five bushels of rye or buckwheat; five bushels
of wheat, or one barrel of flour; twenty bushels of potatoes, two hundred
pounds of bacon or pork, three hogs, fowl not exceeding in value twenty-five
dollars, all canned and frozen goods, canned fruits, preserved fruits or home-
prepared food put up and prepared for use and consumption of the family,
twenty-five dollars in value of forage or hay, one cooking stove and utensils for
cooking therewith, one sewing machine, and in case of a mechanic, the tools
and utensils of his trade, and in case of an oysterman or fisherman his boat
and tackle, not exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars in value; if the
boat and tackle exceed fifteen hunded dollars in value the same shall be sold,
and out of the proceeds the oysterman or fisherman shall first receive one
thousand five hundred dollars in lieu of such boat and tackle.
No officer or other person shall levy or distrain upon, or attach, such articles,
or otherwise seek to subject such articles to any lien or process.
Id.
45. The Code provides the following exemptions for a householder actually engaged in
agriculture:
[A] pair of horses or mules unless he selects or has selected a horse or a mule
[under § 34-26], in which case he shall be entitled under this section only one
., one wagon or cart, one tractor, not exceeding in value three thousand
dollars, two plows, one drag, one harvest cradle, one pitchfork, one rake, two
iron wedges and fertilizer and fertilizer material not exceeding in value one
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these exemptions are absolute and may not be waived.46 The Poor
Debtor's Exemption originally was intended to assure that a
debtor could retain sufficient belongings, generally limited to ne-
cessities, to provide for himself and his family A glance at the
items enumerated, however, reveals that the list is badly antiquat-
ed, and ill-suited to provide theintended benefit to the debtor m
today's modern economy Representative of the list are the follow-
ing items: the family bible, fifty bushels of shelled corn, one cow
and her calf until one year old, one loom, and one spinning wheel.47
Life Insurance
The two primay sections of the Code dealing with the life insur-
ance exemptions48 are not widely known, probably because the sec-
thousand dollars.
Id. § 34-27. For definition of a householder, see note 57 infra.
46. VA. CODE § 34-22 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
47. Id. § 34-26. See note 44 supra.
48. VA. CODE §§ 38.1-448 to 449 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The statues provide as follows:
§§ 38.1-448: If a policy of insurance, whether heretofore or hereafter issued, is
effected by any person on his own life or on another life, in favor of a person
other than himself, or, except in cases of transfer with intent to defraud credi-
tors, if a policy of life insurance is assigned or in any way made payable to any
such person, such lawful beneficiary or assignee thereof, other than the insured
or the person so effecting such insurance or the executors or administrators of
such insured or the person so effecting such insurance, shall be entitled to its
proceeds and avails against the creditors and representatives of the insured
and of the person effecting the same, whether or not the right to change the
beneficiary is reserved or permitted, and whether or not the policy is made
payable to the person whose life is insured if the beneficiary or assignee prede-
ceases such person: provided, that, subject to the statute of limitations, the
amount of any premiums for such insurance paid with intent to defraud credi-
tors, or paid under such circumstances as to be void under § 55-81, with inter-
est thereon, shall enure to the benefit of such creditors from the proceeds of
the policy.
§ 38.1-449:
In the case of policies under the terms of which the right to change the benefi-
ciary is reserved and as to which the cash surrender or loan value thereof is
claimed by such creditors, such insurance shall not be entitled to the protec-
tion afforded by § 38.1-448, except that in the case of householders or heads of
families or their beneficiaries or their assignees the total amount of such insur-
ance entitled to the protection afforded by § 38.1-448 shall not exceed ten
thousand dollars and when the amount of such insurance represented by two
or more policies exceeds such limit, the protection afforded by § 38.1-448 shall
be allowed as to each of such policies pro rata in accordance with the respec-
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tions are not indexed under the heading "Exemptions."49 Enacted
in 1946, the sections are poorly drafted 50 and susceptible to varying
interpretations. No cases have been decided that construe these
sections; the two law review articles that have been written on the
sections5 1 conflict, in part, in their interpretation of the stautes.52
Section 38.1-448 of the Virginia Code declares that, absent
fraud,53 the third party beneficiary or assignee of a life insurance
policy is entitled to the full "proceeds and avails" of the policy as
against the creditors of the insured.5 4 Although not stated explic-
itly, the language of the statute implies that the protection does
not extend to the beneificiary against claims of his creditors.5 5
Thus, if the beneficiary is himself liable, the protection will not
apply Therefore, many creditors are anxious to obtain the signa-
tures of both husband and wife on the obligation. Significantly, the
protection afforded the beneficiary of the policy is unlimited. The
creditors of the insured cannot reach any of the proceeds regard-
less of the amount.
Section 38.1-449 of the Code, however, limits the reach of section
38.1-448. Section 38.1-449 declares that if the policyholder reserves
the right to change the beneficiary, a reservation present in nearly
all life insurance policies today,56 and if the creditor attempts to
reach the cash surrender or loan value of the policy, then the pro-
tive annual premiums involved.
49. See Faris, Exemption of Insurance and Other Property in the Virginias and Caroli-
nas, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 19, 39 (1960).
50. The first section consists of one 200-word sentence and the second of one 119-word
sentence.
51. Faris, supra note 49; Worthington, Exemption of the Debtor's Life Insurance in Vir-
ginia, 42 VA. L. REv. 239 (1956).
52. Compare the interpretations of the final part of § 38.1-449 of Worthington, supra note
51, at 250 and Faris, supra note 49, at 39.
53. If the policy was assigned to a third party in fraud of creditors then the creditors may
reach the full proceeds. Also, the insured's creditors may reach the proceeds of a policy
payable to a third person to the extent of the premium actually paid in fraud of creditors.
VA. CODE § 38.1-448 (Repl. Vol. 1976). See also Worthington, supra note 51, at 251-53.
54. VA. CODE § 38.1-448 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
55. "The freedom of policies from the reach of the insured's creditors does not imply that
the proceeds which have become due because of maturity are not to be liable for the debts
of the named or statutory beneficiary. Such further exemption must rest on an additional
statutory mandate." Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United
States, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 583, 602 (1957) (emphasis original).
56. See Worthington, supra note 51, at 243.
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tection afforded a beneficiary by section 38.1-448 shall not apply
Clearly, as to such policies, the creditors may reach the full
amount of the cash surrender or loan value, thereby forcing the
debtor either to terminate the policy or to pay to the creditor an
equivalent amount. If, however, the insured debtor is a house-
holder,57 then the total amount of the insurance entitled to the
protection of. section 38.1-448 is limited to $10,000.58
The authors of the two articles that discuss sections 38.1-448
and 38.1-449 proceed from the premise, without articulating their
reasons, that the $10,000 limitation applies to the face value of the
policy 59 Under their interpretation, the cash surrender values of
policies with face values of up to $10,000 are exempt, but if the
face value is in excess of this amount, then only that surrender
value or loan value which is attributable to $10,000 of the face
value is exempt. The remainder of the surrender value is available
to the creditors.60 This interpretation, although reasonable, is only
one way to construe the statute. Indeed, the interpretation is not
entirely faithful to the language of the statute. The primary diffi-
culty with their interpretation is that neither Code section refers
to the "face value" of the policy 61 The proper construction of the
statute may be that the $10,000 limitation does not apply to the
face value of the policy, but rather to its cash surrender or loan
value. If this interpretation is correct, the insured debtor's life in-
surance policies are protected fully as long as their cash surrender
or loan value does not exceed $10,000. The creditors may reach
such policies only to the extent the cash surrender or loan value
exceeds $10,000.
This alternative interpretation might be criticized on the ground
that it provides too generous an exemption to the debtor and with-
holds too great an amount from the creditors. The issue is one of
57. A "householder" is any person who maintains a residence. VA. CODE: § 34-1 (Supp.
1979).
58. Id. § 38.1-449 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
59. See Faris, supra note 49, at 39; Worthington, supra note 51, at 253.
60. See Fars, supra note 49, at 39; Worthington, supra note 51, at 250.
61. Another difficulty in interpreting the statute as exempting cash surrender value at-
tributable to $10,000 of face value is that in one instance the exemption may be zero and in
another many thousands of dollars, because the cash surrender value is largely a function of
the age of the policy. In general, the older the policy, the greater the surrender value. Why
the legislature would provide for such an amorphous exemption is unclear.
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statutory construction, not an evaluation of the wisdom of the leg-
islative judgment. Indeed, this more generous interpretation of sec-
tion 38.1-449 seems entirely consistent with the liberal exemption
provided in section 38.1-448, under which the exempt proceeds
available to the beneficiary are unlimited. Equally important, the
exemption of section 38.1-449 is provided only for the "house-
holder," a favored individual in Virginia exemption law. Moreover,
the section containing the troublesome language, although not re-
ferring to "face value," does refer to the cash surrender or loan
value of insurance policies. The language of section 38.1-449 con-
cerning monetary limitations should refer to cash surrender or loan
value because sections 38.1-448 and 38.1-449 make no reference to
the term "face value" and the language of the value limitation
seems to refer back to surrender or loan value.
Arguably, this alternative interpretation also might be objection-
able because, although section 38.1-449 declares that the "total
amount of such insurance entitled to the protection afforded by
[section] 38.1-448 shall not exceed ten thousand dollars, 8 2 section
38.1-448 clearly refers to face value. As already noted, section 38.1-
448 nowhere mentions face value; neither does it, as one author has
assumed, refer exclusively to rights "which arise upon the death of
the insured." 683 Rather, section 38.1-448 refers only to "proceeds
and avails" and it has been asserted correctly that" 'proceeds and
avails' include benefits payable while the insured is still living
"264 Benefits such as the cash surrender value and the loan
value are unquestionably benefits potentially payable while the in-
sured is still living and thus are included in the "proceeds and
avails" language of section 38.1-448.65 Hence, the argument that
62. VA. CODE § 38.1-449 (Repl. Vol. 1976) (emphasis supplied).
63. Faris, supra note 49, at 39.
64. Worthington, supra note 51, at 247.
65. See In re White, 185 F Supp. 609, 613 (N.D. W Va. 1960), and cases cited therein.
The court in In re White, interpreting an identical statute, rejected the trustee's argument
that the words "proceeds and avails" referred only to the "death benefits" payable upon the
maturity of the policy by the death of the insured. The court held that the words "proceeds
and avails" when used in life insurance exemption statutes comprehend the protection of
cash surrender values and other values built up during the life of the policies as well as the
death benefits. Accord, Home Security Life Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 277 N.C. 275, 281, 284,
177 S.E.2d 291, 296-97 (1970) (construing statute almost identical to Virginia statute); see
Schwartz v. Seldon, 153 F.2d 334, 336 (2d Cir. 1945).
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the reference in section 38.1-449 to section 38.1-448 implies that
the $10,000 limitation refers to face value stems from a misinter-
pretation of section 38.1-448 and is not persuasive.
In summary, under the proposed interpretation, the life insur-
ance exemption afforded the Virginia debtor is a generous one.66
The interest of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy is fully ex-
empt from the creditors of the insured, subject to section 38.1-449
which states that if the insured has reserved the right to change
the beneficiary, then the creditor may reach the full cash surrender
or loan value of the policy unless the insured debtor is the head of
the household. In that event, the cash surrender or loan value of
the policy is exempt up to the value of $10,000.
Other Virginia Exemptions
Virginia exempts certain social welfare benefits provided under
the auspices of the state.6 7 The Virginia Code insulates all work-
men's compensation benefits from the claims of creditors;" like-
wise, the statute invalidates any assignment by the debtor of his
workmen's compensation benefits.6 9
A person who receives unemployment compensation holds the
proceeds exempt from any process to collect a judgment.7 0 The ex-
66. In comparison Iowa protects from creditors the proceeds of life insurance payable to
the husband, wife or children of the insured. Iowa also exempts from creditors claims up to
$15,000 in proceeds from husband's life insurance provided the debts are incurred before
the death of the husband. IOWA CODE ANN. § 511.37 (West 1949). Thus, Iowa differs from
Virginia in that beneficiaries other than the spouse and children of the insured receive no
protection.
In North Carolina, on the other hand, the entire proceeds of insurance policies, regardless
of cash surrender value or loan value, are exempt from the claims of creditors of the insured
provided, 1) the creditor cannot demonstrate fraud by the debtor; 2) the proceeds are paya-
ble to beneficiaries other then the insured. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-206 (1975). See also td. §
58-205 (Supp. 1979) (variant formulation of exemption to clarify rights of relatives of in-
sured). North Carolina thus is more generous than Virginia because it imposes no limit on
the beneficiaries or amount of the exemption.
67. For other miscellaneous Virginia exemptions, see note 5 supra.
68. VA. CODE § 65.1-82 (Repl. Vol. 1973) states that, "No claim for compensation under
this Act shall be assignable, and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from
all claims of creditors." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. § 60.1-125 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The text of the section states that
[a]ny assignment, pledge or encumbrance of any right to benefits which are or
may become due or payable under this title shall be void; and such rights to
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emption, however, is not absolute. The statute does not exempt
unemployment compensation funds that have been commingled
with other funds of the debtor.1 1 Also, a creditor whose claim de-
rived from furnishing "necessaries" to the debtor, his spouse, or his
dependents is not barred by the exemption. 2
These exemptions serve the public policy goal of ensuring that
the debtor and his family retain some minimal degree of protection
in times of hardship. At the same time, the exemption reflects a
realization that to subject such social welfare benefits to the claims
of creditors would undermine the intended purpose of the pro-
grams, to provide help for the debtor who is incapable of providing
for himself. The provision that denies the exemption when the
funds have been commingled may have the effect of denying the
exemption from operating because the uninformed debtor inno-
cently could commingle his unemployment compensation funds
with other funds in his general checking account.
FEDERAL EXEMPTIONS AVAILABLE TO VIRGINIA DEBTORS
Wage Exemption
The wage exemption is of paramount importance to the debtor
because it gives him the opportunity to retain a minimal amount of
his wages with which to rehabilitate himself. In 1968 Congress
passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act. s Title III of the Act
limits garnishment of earnings to the lesser of twenty-five percent
of "disposable earnings '7 4 per week or the amount by which dis-
posable earnings for a week exceed thirty times the federal mini-
mum hourly wage." "Disposable earnings" are defined as "that
benefits shall be exempt from levy, execution, attachment or any other remedy
whatsoever provided for the collection of debts; and benefits received by any
individual, so long as they are not mingled with other funds of the recipient,
shall be exempt from any remedy whatsoever for the collection of all debts
except debts incurred for necessaries furnished to such individual or his spouse
or dependents during the time when such individual was unemployed. Any




73. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1970).
74. Id. § 1672(b).
75. The current federal minimum hourly wage is $3.10. 29 U.S.C.A. § 106(a)(1) (West
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part of earnings remaining after the deduction . of any
amounts required by law to be withheld.17 6 The Act, binding on all
states"7 to the extent that it establishes a minimum amount that
the debtor is entitled to hold exempt from garnishment proceed-
ings, expressly permits states the option of providing an even
greater wage exemption.78 Virginia has adopted the federal wage
exemption almost verbatim. The statute guarantees to the debtor,
on a weekly basis, the greater of either seventy-five percent of his
disposable earnings or thirty tines the current federal minimum
hourly wage. 9
Miscellaneous Federal Exemptins.
The United States Congress has provided an assortment of other
exemptions applicable to monies owed to or received by the debtor
derived from certain specified federal funds. Payments of benefits
due or to become due under any law administered by the Veteran's
Administration are exempt from the claims of creditors either
before or after they have been received by the beneficiary.80 This
law has been interpreted to protect funds after they have been de-
posited in the debtor's bank account" but held not to extend to
real or personal property purchased with the exempt funds.8 2
Other statutes exempt Social Security payments,8" Foreign Service
Retirement and Disability payments,84 and any compensation re-
ceived from the federal government arising out of injury or death
1978). As of January 1, 1981, the minimum wage will increase to $3.35 per hour. Id. See
Note, Garnishment in Virginia, supra this issue.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(b).
77. Id. § 1673(c) (West Supp. 1979).
78. Id. § 1677 (West 1974).
79. VA. CODE § 34-29 (Supp. 1979). The 1978 amendment to the statute severely limits
the debtor's wage exemption if the garnishment is for the purpose of enforcing any order for
support. See Note, Enforcing Family Support Obligations in Virginia, infra this issue.
80. 38 U.S.C.A. § 3101(a) (West 1979).
81. Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 (1937); Hannah v. Hannah, 191 Ga. 134, 11 S.E.2d
779 (1940).
82. Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545 (1939); Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). See also In re Vary's Estate, 65 Mich. App. 447, 237 N.W.2d
498 (1975), afl'd, 401 Mich. 340, 258 N.W.2d 11 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Ivy v. Michi-
gan Dept. of Treasury, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978) (creditor cannot attach proceeds m debtor's
checking or savings account).
84. 22 U.S.C. § 1104 (1970).
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from a "war risk hazard. '8 5 The wages of a master, seaman, ap-
prentice, and fisherman employed on fishing vessels are exempt
from execution, garnishment, or attachment," as are all death and
disability benefits paid under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. 7 Although civil service retirement
benefits are protected,88 at least one federal court has held that
the exemption applies only to future pension amounts and not to
those already paid and accumulated in segregated savings ac-
counts. 9 The Railroad Retirement Act provides an exemption for
all annuities and pensions that derive from the Act;90 a similar ex-
emption is applicable to Railroad Unemployment Insurance bene-
fits.l Finally, Congress has exempted all special pensions paid to
winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor.2
THE INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT EXEMPTION SCHEME
Its Anachronistic Character
Probably the most obvious failure of the Virginia scheme lies in
its anachronistic nature. The outdated character of the statutory
exemptions is illustrated most dramatically by the Poor Debtor's
Exemption" which was enacted in 1837 "' The language of the
statute as it appears today is similar to the language used over 142
years ago. 5 Obviously written for an agrarian society, the statute is
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1717 (1970).
86. 46 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1970).
88. 5 U.S.C.A. § 8346 (West Supp. 1978).
89. In re Prestien, 427 F Supp. 1003 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
90. 45 U.S.C.A. § 231m (West Supp. 1979).
91. 45 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1970).
92. 38 U.S.C.A. § 562(c) (West 1979).
93. VA. CODE § 34-26 (Supp. 1979); see notes 44-46 supra & accompanying text.
94. Act of March 30, 1837, c. 69, § i, 1836-37 Va. Acts 46.
95. A comparison of the following language of the original statute provides an illustration
of the piecemeal revision the statute has undergone:
Be it enacted by the general assembly, That it shall be lawful for each white
person in this commonwealth, being a husband or parent, against whom an
execution may hereafter issue upon judgments for which the cause of action
shall arise after the first day of August, eighteen hundred and thirty-seven, to
select or set apart one cow, one bedstead, bed and necessary bedding for the
same, half dozen knives and forks, six plates, two dishes, two basins, one pot,
one oven, six pieces of wood or earthenware, one loom and its appurtenances,
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wholly inadequate to provide for the needs of a debtor in modern
times. For example, few debtors today are likely to own a loom,
twenty-five bushels of rye or buckwheat, a barrel of flour, or three
hogs. Although the statute has been amended numerous times
since its enactment, it remains one of the most out-of-date provi-
sions in the Virginia Code. The amendments represent nothing
more than piecemeal attempts by the legislature to include random
contemporary items. The 1976 amendment, for example, added to
the list a freezer and a clothes dryer.98 The net result of these
piecemeal reforms, however, is a provision of the Code which re-
fers, in the same sentence, to such items as a loom, a spinning
wheel, and a sewing machine. Further evidence of the anachronis-
tic nature of these provisions is revealed by the omission of the
debtor's automobile, a virtual necessity, although the statue is
careful to exempt an axe and a deck of cards. 8 Likewise, the statu-
tory exemptions offer no protection for alimony or child support
payments the debtor may be receiving. If one purpose of the ex-
emption laws is to provide basic necessities for the debtor and his
family, support income under a court decree should merit legisla-
tive protection.99
one spinning wheel, one pair of cards, one axe, also five barrels of corn, or one
barrel of flour, two hundred pounds of bacon or pork, five dollars in value of
hay or other forage
Id.
96. The clothes dryer was limited to a value of $150; the 1976 amendment also added
frozen goods to the list. Acts of March 24, 1976, c. 150, § 5, 1976 Va. Acts 186.
97. VA. CODE § 34-26 (Supp. 1979).
98. Id. Some imaginative attorneys, however, have not been constrained by such statutes.
In California, a court recently held that an automobile that was used by a licensed real
estate salesperson to transport himself and prospective buyers to and from properties for
sales could be considered a "tool or an implement" and therefore was exempt from execu-
tion. Sun Ltd. v. Casey, 157 Cal. Rptr. 576 (Ct. App. 1979).
99. See Vukowich, supra note 1, at 824-25:
Although alimony and child support payments represent an important type
of support income, these payments rarely are exempted from the claims of ei-
ther the payor's or the payee's creditors. This failure to protect support
payments after receipt obviously contradicts the avowed purpose of the exemp-
tion laws - protection of debtors' families.
Id. But see note 79 supra. See also Note, Enforcing Family Support Obligations in Vir-
ginia, infra this issue.
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Favortism
Another shortcoming of the Virginia exemption scheme is that
certain debtors are favored over others for no apparent reason.100
For example, certain debtors, especially farmers, are more likely to
possess a greater proportion of the items exempted under the Poor
Debtor's Exemption than are other debtors. Although this statute
exempts the mechanic's tools as well as the boat and tackle of an
oysterman or fisherman,' 0 it provides no such protection for any
other occupations. The statute that exempts certain articles be-
longing to the "householder engaged in agriculture" further illus-
trates the inherent favoritism of the exemption scheme. 02 As
noted previously, this section allows the farmer to exempt certain
articles m addition to the homestead exemption, and in addition to
the items specified in the Poor Debtor's Exemption. Although per-
haps justifiable when most individuals engaged in some form of
farming, this special protection of a debtor engaged in agriculture
today is unreasonable. 03
Lack of Notice
Another defect in Virginia's exemption plan, which may rise to
constitutional dimension,0 is the failure to require any form of
notice to the debtor of the availability of his exemptions. That
many debtors have been deprived of the exemptions to which they
are entitled simply because they were unaware of their exemption
rights is probable. The lack of a statutory mandate that the debtor
be fully informed of his rights is especially egregious; the purpose
of the exemption statutes is thwarted if the debtor is ignorant of
their existence. A statute that ensures that the debtor know his
100. Vukowich, supra note 1, at 829. The author notes that "[n]ot all debtors' needs are
the same, and the statutory specifications consequently often favor certain debtors over
others." Id.
101. VA. CODE § 34-26. See note 44 supra.
102. VA. CODE § 34-27. See note 45 supra.
103. The number of farms in Virginia dropped from 80,000 in 1964 to 53,000 in 1974.
During the same period, the amount of agricultural production fell from 12,002,000 acres to
9,678,000 acres while the average acreage per farm rose from 149 acres to 184 acres. U.S.
FACT BOOK 679 (1978).
Concomitantly, nonagricultural employees rose from a total of 1,018,000 in 1960 to
1,805,000 in 1974. Id. at 401.
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exemption rights and that guarantees him a right to a hearing
when necessary can remedy what arguably is a lack of due process
in the Virginia exemption plan.10 5
Failure to Advance Policies
The current statutory exemptions fail to advance in any consis-
tent and coherent fashion the basic policy goals that underlie the
exemption scheme. If the exemptions are intended to reconcile the
competing concerns of debtor and creditor, the present scheme in
Virginia is inadequate. From the debtor's point of view, many of
Virginia's exemptions are unrealistically conservative. From the
creditor's point of view, allowing the debtor to claim certain ex-
emptions regardless of need is unfair and goes beyond the public
policy justification of providing minimal necessary protection to
the debtor.
The homestead exemption provides an illustration. The purpose
of this exemption is to safeguard the debtor's home. This purpose,
however, is undermined by the inadequacy of the $5,000 limit.108
Because of the rapid rise in property values caused by today's in-
flationary economy a homeowner doubtless will acquire $5,000
worth of equity in his house in a very short tine. Thus, because
the homestead exemption currently is limited to $5,000 and be-
cause the debtor's equity frequently will exceed this amount, the
debtor's home may be subject to a forced sale. The debtor and his
family consequently may lose their home and though they will get
$5,000 that probably will be inadequate to permit the purchase of
a new home.107 The Virginia homestead exemption therefore
104. See Greenfield, A Constitutional Limitation on the Enforcement of Judg-
ments-Due Process and Exemptions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 877. The author concludes that
"[ilt is clear that existing statutes, which do not provide for any notice or hearing
before levy, do not meet current standards of due process." Id. at 923.
105. See id. at 928. Greenfield suggests a form of notice that informs the debtor not only
of the specific property actually being levied upon by the sheriff but also of all categories of
property that may be claimed as exempt. Such a notice states that if the debtor wishes to
claim as exempt any property the sheriff is attempting to levy upon he must complete an
attached "Claim of Exemption" within 10 days after the levy. If the judgment creditor
desires to contest the claim of exemption, he must do so within seven days after the claim of
exemption is returned to the sheriff, in which event a hearing will be held after notice to the
debtor to determine whether the debtor is entitled to keep the property as exempt. Id.
106. VA. CODE § 34-4 (Supp. 1979).
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should be increased to a figure that more accurately reflects to-
day's increased home values, such as $15,000 or $20,000.los Also,
the amount of the exemption could be stabilized by indexing it to
market conditions.
The current homestead exemption is ill-suited to accomplish its
purposes in other ways. For example, if the homestead exemption
represents the judgment of the legislature regarding the minimum
amount to which any debtor is entitled, that judgment is under-
mined by the many procedural obstacles placed between the
debtor and his enjoyment of the exemption. Specifically, if the ex-
emption did not have to be "declared" 10 9 but was automatic, the
debtor could not lose his exemption unwittingly Also, if the ex-
emption is truly for the benefit of the debtors' family as much as
the debtor himself, then that policy is subverted if the homestead
can be lost when the debtor fails to claim it; 110 the debtor's family
should be entitled to claim the exemption if the debtor neglects to
act.111 Furthermore, because the homestead exemption is not self-
executing, the debtor, even after he has complied with all the pre-
scribed procedures, still may have to obtain a motion to quash112 at
his own expense if his exempt property is appropriated by credi-
tors.1 ' Such procedural obstacles increase the likelihood that the
homestead will be lost because of technicalities.
The most serious failing of the homestead exemption is the stat-
ute providing for its waiver. 114 Virtually every recorded deed of
107. See Vukowich, supra note 1, at 806.
108. For example, California provides heads of households with a $40,000 real property
homestead exemption. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1979). The homestead value is
that which exceeds liens and encumbrances on the property. Id. All others are entitled to a
$25,000 exemption in real property over and above liens and encumbrances on the property.
Id. Texas is even more generous. The state constitution offers every family a choice between
a rural homestead of two hundred acres with no value limitation or an urban residential
homestead plus an urban business homestead. Tsx. CONST. art. 16, § 51 (1876).
109. See notes 16-19 supra & accompanying text.
110. See notes 14-15 supra & accompanying text.
111. The spouse and children of the debtor can claim the homestead only after the
debtor's death. VA. CODE §§ 34-11, -15 (Repl. Vol. 1976). Additionally, when the debtor
waives his homestead, the spouse or children cannot contest the waiver after the debtor's
death. Linkenhoker's Heirs v. Detrick, 81 Va. 44, 56-57 (1885).
112. See VA. CODE § 8.01-477 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
113. Additionally, the Virginia Code provides no procedure for claiming the exemption of
the items enumerated in § 34-26. How the debtor may claim these exemptions is uncertain.
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trust in Virginia today contains a waiver of the homestead exemp-
tion.115 Apparently, the inclusion of such contractual waivers is au-
tomatic with every lending institution. Even though the waiver it-
self must be clear and unequivocal, the statute does not require
that the debtor waive his exemption knowingly and intelligently 111
The typical debtor is not in a position to refuse to sign a contract
containing a waiver of exemption provision; if the debtor's need is
sufficient he will sign regardless of the waiver. Thus, the practical
effect of the statute allowing for waiver of the homestead is the de
facto abolition of the exemption for a great many debtors. Such a
result is inconsistent with an exemption scheme that purports to
offer the debtor a certain minimum allowance with which to meet
his immediate needs.
Availability of Exemptions Regardless of Need
From the creditor's point of view, the debtor should not be per-
mitted certain exemptions without regard to his need. Indeed, if
such a complaint is justified, it demonstrates the extent to which
the statutory exemptions have deviated from their intended pur-
poses. The life insurance exemption is illustrative. As noted above,
the beneficiary of a life insurance policy takes the proceeds free of
all claims of creditors.1 7 The statute does not limit its protection
to any specific class of beneficiaries, such as the dependents of the
insured debtor, but extends the protection to any lawful benefici-
ary or assignee of a beneficiary If the primary justification for the
life insurance exemption is to afford protection to the dependents
of the insured, s8 a provision that protects all beneficiaries cannot
be justified on policy grounds. There is no apparent reason why
every beneficiary should merit unlimited protection. To the con-
114. Id. § 34-22 (Repl. Vol. 1976); see notes 38-42 supra & accompanying text.
115. In a random sampling of numerous deed books in the Williamsburg-James City
County Courthouse, every deed of trust contained the phrase "exemptions waived" or some
equivalent. The Virginia Code provides the following:
The words "exemptions waived," or words of like purport, shall be construed
as if the deed set forth: "The grantor hereby waives the benefit of his exemp-
tions as to the debt hereby secured and as to all other obligations which may
be imposed upon him by the provisions of this deed of trust."
Id. § 55-60(3) (Supp. 1979).
116. See notes 38-41 supra & accompanying text.
117. VA. CODE § 38.1-448 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
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trary, the exemption should protect only those to whom the debtor
owes some duty of support. More importantly, the exemption
should protect the beneficiary only to the extent reasonably neces-
sary for his needs. Likewise, the creditor will object to the provi-
sion that exempts up to $10,000 of the cash surrender value of the
policy if the insured is a householder. 1 9 The objection is not with-
out merit; to keep this amount from the creditor is unfair, particu-
larly if the protection such a policy affords exceeds the amount
necessary to meet the needs of the debtor and his family
Lastly, certain items enumerated in the Poor Debtor's Exemp-
tion120 create the potential for debtor abuse. A sophisticated
debtor may insulate a substantial amount of his resources from the
creditor's reach by investing in exempt items of unusual value such
as Gutenberg Bibles or oriental rugs before judgment. Ostensibly,
such items would qualify for the exemption even though the actual
value is far in excess of the extrinsic value that the statutes in-
tended to protect. In order to avoid the possibility of such abuse,
the Poor Debtor's Exemption should be qualified by a requirement
that the debtor have the burden of proof, when claiming the ex-
emption, of showing that the items claimed comport with his
needs.
Shortcomings of the Wage Exemption
Virginia's wage exemption, adopted from the Consumer Credit
Protection Act,1 21 also warrants reexamination. The exemption
often may be inadequate. The National Commission on Consumer
Finance has recommended- an increase in the federal exemption by
limiting garnishment of earnings to the lesser of twenty-five per-
cent of disposable earnings per week or the amount by which dis-
posable earnings exceed forty, rather than thirty, times the federal
minimum hourly wage. 122 Additionally, Virginia's wage exemption
lacks flexibility because it limits garnishment without reference to
the actual needs of the debtor. One commentator has suggested
118. Vukowich, supra note 1, at 810 comments that "[t]he major justification of the ex-
emption is that life insurance affords protection to dependents of the insured. "
119. VA. CODE § 38.1-449 (Repl. Vol. 1976); see text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
120. VA. CODE § 34-26. See note 44 supra.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1974); see notes 67-69 supra & accompanying text.
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that the percentage of exemption be increased five percent for each
dependent up to a maximum of three and that the multiple of the
minimum hourly wage be increased by five for each dependent.12 3
By permitting flexibility in the wage exemption, the scheme would
approximate more closely the needs of the debtor.
Summary
Virginia's statutory exemption scheme is unsuited to perform its
proper function, the reconciliation of the interests of both debtor
and creditor. Scattered throughout the Code, the exemptions are
incapable of advancing any clear legislative policy or purpose.
Many of the provisions are so outdated that mere amendment
would be inadequate. Indeed, the occasional attempts at revision
and piecemeal amendments are largely culpable for the current
state of the exemption scheme. The amendments themselves fre-
quently bear little relation to any legislative purpose; certain
amendments appear to be no more than responses to pressures of
particular interest groups."2 4 Many of the amendments appear to
have been adopted in a casual if not careless manner. For example,
as a result of the 1977 amendments, section 34-4 conflicts with sec-
tion 34-13 regarding the amount of the homestead exemption
which may be claimed in personal property. 125
Because further attempts at amending the existing statutes
likely would compound rather than resolve these problems the cur-
rent statutes should be repealed and replaced by a new exemption
scheme. The legislature should undertake the task only after a
thorough re-examination of the policies that underlie the exemp-
tion statutes and of how best to advance such policies.
The Uniform Exemptions Act 128 provides a well-reasoned alter-
native worthy of careful study by the Virginia legislature. Although
a comprehensive examination of the Act is beyond the scope of
this Note, some representative provisions illustrate its appeal as a
122. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES 34 (1972). See also Vukowich, supra note 1, at 818.
123. Vukowch, supra note 1, at 820.
124. See Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critiques and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459,
1466 (1959), wherein the author observes, "[M]any statutes operate unevenly, for legisla-
tures have responded to particular interest groups by exempting specialized property. "
125. See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
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starting point for revision. As a whole, the Uniform Exemptions
Act represents a comprehensive plan of exemptions rather than a
conglomeration of miscellaneous statutes. More importantly, its
provisions were drafted in the context of today's modern, albeit
inflationary, economy For example, the value of exemptions are
tied to the Consumer Price Index,127 thereby circumventing the
problem posed by inflation. The homestead exemption is set at
$10,000,128 an amount that more closely approximates the needs of
a debtor and his family Basic necessities that the Uniform Exemp-
tions Act provides for the debtor, likewise reflect its more modern
character. Exempt items include a health aids and welfare benefits,
such as social security and unemployment compensation. 9 Cer-
tain enumerated items of personal property, including a motor ve-
hicle, also may be exempt provided the debtor's interest does not
exceed a specified dollar amount.130 The section dealing with life
insurance exempts up to $1,500 of accrued dividends and loan val-
ues on any unmatured policy owned by the debtor, effectively de-
nying a windfall enjoyed by beneficiaries at the expense of the
creditors in Virginia.' 31 Lastly, the Act bars waiver of the exemp-
tions13 2 and provides minimum due process requirements.133
BANKRuPTCY ExEMPTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT UPON VIRGINIA LAW
On Novembr 6, 1978 pursuant to the authority granted expressly
by the Constitution,' Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 which enumerates specific exemptions to which a
bankrupt is entitled.3 5 A consideration of the effects of the new
bankruptcy law is essential to an understanding of the current sta-
tus of Virginia's statutory exemption plan. The relationship be-
tween the state and federal exemption plans must be balanced del-
126. UNIFORM ExEmpnrNs AcT §§ 1 to 25.
127. Id. § 2(a).
128. Id. § 4(a).
129. Id. § 5; cf. VA. CODE § 60.1-125 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (exemption of unemployment com-
pensation); id. § 64.1-82 (exemption of workmen's compensation benefits).
130. UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS AcT § 8.
131. Id. § 7.
132. Id. § 12.
133. Id. § 14.
134. The Constitution gives Congress the power to enact "uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
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icately, lest unnatural incentives for bankruptcy arise.136 The
Bankruptcy Reform Act effectively overrules any conflicting state
statutes.
The exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act resem-
ble closely the exemptions available in the Uniform Exemptions
Act.137 This is because the Uniform Exemptions Act was written in
anticipation of a new bankruptcy law and several persons active in
drafting it also contributed to the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws."'8 When the new bankruptcy law first was enacted it ap-
peared that, at least in a bankruptcy context, the Virginia debtor
would have the benefit of a new, modernized exemption scheme.
The original optimism, however, proved premature.
A provision in the Bankruptcy Reform Act states that the debtor
may exempt either (1) property that is specified under the 1978
Act "unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor.
specifically does not so authorize" or (2) property that is exempt
under other federal law and under the law of his state." 9 This pro-
vision is unfortunate because, by giving the states the freedom to
opt out of the federal exemption scheme, it thwarts the goal of
uniformity, one of the primary purposes of bankruptcy law.
The Virginia legislature responded quickly to the opportunity
afforded by the Bankruptcy Reform Act. On January 22, 1979, less
than three months after the 1978 Act was passed, a bill was offered
in the Virginia House of Delegates declaring that Virginia would
opt out of the federal exemption plan.140 Although no hearings
135. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(e) (West Supp. 1979).
136. If a significant difference exists between an individual state's exemption laws and
those permitted in bankruptcy, the incentive to apply for relief in bankruptcy is enhanced.
For example, if the federal exemptions are more generous, the debtor is more likely to peti-
tion for voluntary bankruptcy in order to obtain the greater exemptions. Conversely, when
the state exemptions offer more to the debtor, the creditor would petition for involuntary
bankruptcy in order to reach property that would be exempt under state law. See UNIFORM
EXEMPTIONs Acr, at iv.
137. See notes 127-33 supra.
138. The committee that drafted the Uniform Exemptions Act began its work in the year
immediately after the Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws was submitted to
the Congress. Mr. Frank Kennedy, a member of the Special Committee on the Uniform
Exemptions Act, was also Executive Director of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States.
139. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis supplied). If the debtor chooses the
latter alternative he also may exempt an interest in property m which the debtor has an
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were held and no witnesses called to testify, the bill passed by a
unanimous vote of the House of Delegates on February 1, 1979,
and by a unanimous vote of the Senate on February 16, 1979. The
Governor signed the bill into law on March 31, 1979.
The action of the legislature was ill-advised. It is a mystery why
a bill of such import would be adopted so quickly and without the
benefit of the views of those with expertise in the field, many of
whom were unaware of the legislation until after it was signed into
law. The rationale of the bill is not entirely clear; however, the fact
that the Virginia Bankers' Association was actively lobbying for its
enactment may provide some clue to the intent of the legisla-
tion.141 The bill is a windfall to creditors because Virginia will re-
tam the present exemption plan, with all its shortcomings, rather
than allow the bankrupt the benefit of the more generous exemp-
tions provided in the Bankruptcy Reform Act.14 2
If in enacting the amendment the legislature intended to main-
tam the status quo in Virginia debtor-creditor relations, it has
failed. Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the commencement of a
bankruptcy case creates an estate. 14 s The estate includes all prop-
erty of the debtor, even that which the debtor may claim as ex-
empt. Only after all property has come into the estate is the debtor
interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that interest would have
been exempt from process under relevant nonbankruptcy law. Id. See notes 146-49 infra &
accompanying text.
140. The bill, which emanated from the Committee on Corporations, Insurance and
Banking, amends the Code of Virginia by adding § 34-3.1. The section reads as follows: "No
individual may exempt from the property of the estate in any bankruptcy proceeding the
property specified in [Section 522] subsection d of the Bankruptcy Reform Act except
as may otherwise be expressly permitted under this title." VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Cum. Supp.
1979).
Several other states have enacted similar legislation. See, e.g., Act of July 3, 1979, Pub.
Act No. 79-363, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (to be codified as FLA. STAT. ANN. §
222.20); Act of Sept. 28, 1979, File No. 116, 31, 1979 Ohio Legis. Bull. 363 (Anderson) (to be
codified as OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.662).
141. In a telephone conversation with the author of this Note, counsel to the Virginia
Bankers Association stated that he drafted the bill.
142. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West Supp. 1979). The exemptions include a $7,500 home-
stead, $1,200 interest in one automobile, $200 of household goods, $500 worth of jewelry,
$750 of professional or trade goods, unmatured life insurance, $4,000 of the loan value in a




entitled to claim his exemptions. 1 4 Now that the debtor can "ex-
empt out" of the enlarged bankruptcy estate only those exemp-
tions provided for under the Virginia scheme, the bankruptcy es-
tate will include certain assets that the debtor did not surrender
under the former bankruptcy law. Because Virginia does not ex-
pressly provide for the exemption of such assets, they now will be
lost to the bankrupt altogether.145 Far from maintaining the status
quo, the amendment to Virginia's Code effectively worsens the po-
sition of the debtor.
This conclusion is subject to one potentially major qualification.
The 1978 Bankruptcy Act provides that when the state and local
exemptions are applicable, as is now the law of Virginia, the
debtor, in addition to those exemptions, also may exempt any in-
terest in property held as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant
to the same extent that interest would be exempt from process
under state law. 46 In Virginia, property owned as tenants by the
entirety and as joint tenancy is insulated from the claims of credi-
tors of an individual cotenant. 47 This provision allows a bankrupt
to exempt all such property regardless of its value. Because most
homes and automobiles of married persons are owned by both
spouses, the exemption provides a potential windfall for the
bankrupt. 14 8
The amendment may have other unintended effects. For in-
stance, the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act declares unenforceable
any waiver of the debtor's exemptions if the debtor executed the
waiver in favor of a creditor with an unsecured claim. 149 This pro-
vision clearly overrules the Virginia Code section that permits a
143. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West Supp. 1979).
144. Id. § 522. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6324.
145. For example, under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, a debtor's claims against others
enter the bankruptcy estate. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6323. Virginia, however, provides no exemption
for such an asset.
146. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1979).
147. See generally Murphy, Cotenances: A Critique for Creditors, 48 VA. L. REv. 405
(1962).
148. See Ackerly, Tenants by the Entirety and the Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra this
issue.
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waiver of the debtor's homestead exemption, 1 0 insofar as it allows
a waiver of homestead exemptions in a bankruptcy case. A waiver
is still permissible, however, in a state collection proceeding. Thus,
a debtor who has executed a waiver of exemptions has a significant
incentive to confront his creditors in the bankruptcy forum where
the waiver is unenforceable. The introduction of such artificial in-
ducements to bankruptcy is not conducive to healthy debtor-credi-
tor relationships.
CONCLUSION
The recent amendment adopted by the Virginia General Assem-
bly demonstrates its rigid adherence to an exemption plan that is
intentionally inconsistent, grossly outdated, and inequitable.
Strong consideration should be given to the repeal of this amend-
ment and a complete examination of the current statutory exemp-
tions. No purpose is served by permitting one set of antiquated
exemptions to be applied in two distinct contexts, the bankruptcy
forum and the forum of a state collection procedure. By repealing
the recently enacted amendment, Virginia wisely would allow the
exemptions available under the Bankruptcy Reform Act to prevail
in a bankruptcy proceeding. In determining what exemptions
ought to be available m the state's collection procedure, the Vir-
ginia legislature should consider carefully the recently proposed
Uniform Exemptions Act. The adoption of the Act by Virginia
would establish an exemption plan that is internally consistent,
modern, and equitable, and that is balanced carefully with exemp-
tions available under the bankruptcy law.151
MICHAEL P COTTER
149. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(e) (West Supp. 1979).
150. VA. CODE § 34-22 (Repl. Vol. 1976). See notes 37-42 supra & accompanying text.
151. This is essential in order to ensure that no unnatural incentives to bankruptcy arise
because of a disparity between the state and bankruptcy exemption schemes. See note 136
supra.
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